Appendix 2

Annual Treasury Management Review

2016/17

Cambridgeshire and Peterborough Fire Authority

June 2017

Annual Treasury Management Review 2016/17

Introduction

This Authority is required by regulations issued under the Local Government Act 2003 to produce an annual treasury management review of activities and the actual prudential and treasury indicators for 2016/17. This report meets the requirements of both the CIPFA Code of Practice on Treasury Management, (the Code), and the CIPFA Prudential Code for Capital Finance in Local Authorities, (the Prudential Code).

During 2016/17 the minimum reporting requirements were that the full Fire Authority should receive the following reports:

- an annual treasury strategy in advance of the year
- a mid-year, (minimum), treasury update report
- an annual review following the end of the year describing the activity compared to the strategy, (this report)

The regulatory environment places responsibility on members for the review and scrutiny of treasury management policy and activities. This report is, therefore, important in that respect, as it provides details of the outturn position for treasury activities and highlights compliance with the Authority's policies previously approved by members.

This Authority confirms that it has complied with the requirement under the Code to give prior scrutiny to all of the above treasury management reports by the Policy and Resources Committee before they were reported to the full Fire Authority.

Treasury Position as at 31 March 2017

At the beginning and the end of 2016/17 the Authority's treasury (excluding borrowing by PFI and finance leases) position was as follows:

TABLE 1	31 March 2016 Principal	Rate/ Return	Average Life yrs	31 March 2017 Principal	Rate/ Return	Average Life yrs
Total debt	***£3.200m***	***4.40%***	***38***	***£3.200m***	***4.40%***	***37***
CFR	***£3.527m***			***£3.229m***		
Over / (under) borrowing	***(£0.327)m***			***(£0. 29)m***		
Total investments	***£16.112m***	***0.80%***		***£16.986m***	***0.51%***	
Net investments	**£12.912m**			**£13.786m**		

The Strategy for 2016/17

The expectation for interest rates within the treasury management strategy for 2016/17 anticipated low but rising Bank Rate, (starting in quarter 1 of 2017), and gradual rises in medium and longer term fixed borrowing rates during 2017/18. Variable, or short-term rates, were expected to be the cheaper form of borrowing over the period. Continued uncertainty in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis promoted a cautious approach, whereby investments would continue to be dominated by low counterparty risk considerations, resulting in relatively low returns compared to borrowing rates.

In this scenario, the treasury strategy was to postpone borrowing to avoid the cost of holding higher levels of investments and to reduce counterparty risk.

During 2016/17 there was major volatility in PWLB rates with rates falling during quarters 1 and 2 to reach historically very low levels in July and August, before rising significantly during quarter 3, and then partially easing back towards the end of the year.

The Economy and Interest Rates

The two major landmark events that had a significant influence on financial markets in the 2016/17 financial year were the UK EU referendum on 23 June and the election of President Trump in the USA on 9 November. The first event had an immediate impact in terms of market expectations of when the first increase in Bank Rate would happen, pushing it back from quarter 3 2018 to quarter 4 2019. At its 4 August meeting, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) cut Bank Rate from 0.5% to 0.25% and the Bank of England's Inflation Report produced forecasts warning of a major shock to economic activity in the UK, which would cause economic growth to fall almost to zero in the second half of 2016. The MPC also warned that it would be considering cutting Bank Rate again towards the end of 2016 in order to support growth. In addition, it restarted quantitative easing with purchases of £60bn of gilts and £10bn of corporate bonds, and also introduced the Term Funding Scheme whereby potentially £100bn of cheap financing was made available to banks.

In the second half of 2016, the UK economy confounded the Bank's pessimistic forecasts of August. After a disappointing quarter 1 of only +0.2% GDP growth, the three subsequent quarters of 2016 came in at +0.6%, +0.5% and +0.7% to produce an annual growth for 2016 overall, compared to 2015, of no less than 1.8%, which was very nearly the fastest rate of growth of any of the G7 countries. Needless to say, this meant that the MPC did not cut Bank Rate again after August but, since then, inflation has risen rapidly due to the effects of the sharp devaluation of sterling after the referendum. By the end of March 2017, sterling was 17% down against the dollar but had not fallen as far against the euro. In February 2017, the latest CPI inflation figure had risen to 2.3%, above the MPC's inflation target of 2%. However, the MPC's view was that it would look through near term supply side driven inflation, (i.e. not raise Bank Rate), caused by sterling's devaluation, despite forecasting that inflation would reach nearly 3% during 2017 and 2018. This outlook, however, is dependent on domestically generated inflation, (i.e. wage inflation), continuing to remain subdued despite the fact that unemployment is at historically very low levels and is on a downward trend. Market expectations for the first increase in Bank Rate moved forward to quarter 3 2018 by the end of March 2017 in response to increasing concerns around inflation.

USA. Quarterly growth in the US has been very volatile during 2016 but a strong performance since mid-2016, and strongly rising inflation, prompted the Fed into raising rates in December 2016 and March 2017. The US is the first major western country to start on a progressive upswing in rates. Overall growth in 2016 was 1.6%.

EU. The EU is furthest away from an upswing in rates; the European Central Bank (ECB) has cut rates into negative territory, provided huge tranches of cheap financing and been doing major quantitative easing purchases of debt during 2016-17 in order to boost growth from consistently weak levels, and to get inflation up from near zero towards its target of 2%. These purchases have resulted in depressed bond yields in the EU, but, towards the end of 2016, yields rose, probably due at least in part to rising political concerns around the positive prospects for populist parties and impending general elections in 2017 in the Netherlands, France and Germany. The action taken by the ECB has resulted in economic growth improving significantly in the Eurozone to an overall figure of 1.7% for 2016, with Germany achieving a rate of 1.9% as the fastest growing G7 country.

On the other hand, President Trump's election and promise of fiscal stimulus, which are likely to increase growth and inflationary pressures in the US, have resulted in Treasury yields rising sharply since his election. Gilt yields in the UK have been caught between these two influences and the result is that the gap in yield between US treasuries and UK gilts has widened sharply during 2016/17 due to market perceptions that the UK is still likely to be two years behind the US in starting on an upswing in rates despite a track record of four years of strong growth.

Equity markets. The result of the referendum, and the consequent devaluation of sterling, boosted the shares of many FTSE 100 companies which had major earnings which were not denominated in sterling. The overall trend since then has been steeply upwards and received further momentum after Donald Trump was elected President as he had promised a major fiscal stimulus to boost the US economy and growth rate.

Borrowing Rates in 2016/17

PWLB certainty maturity borrowing rates

During 2016-17, PWLB rates fell from April to June and then gaining fresh downward impetus after the referendum and Bank Rate cut, before staging a partial recovery through to December and then falling slightly through to the end of March. The graphs and table for PWLB rates below and in appendix 3, show, for a selection of maturity periods, the average borrowing rates, the high and low points in rates, spreads and individual rates at the start and the end of the financial year.



Investment Rates in 2016/17

After the EU referendum, Bank Rate was cut from 0.5% to 0.25% on 4 August and remained at that level for the rest of the year. Market expectations as to the timing of the start of monetary tightening started the year at quarter 3 2018, but then moved back to around the end of 2019 in early August before finishing the year back at quarter 3 2018. Deposit rates continued into the start of 2016/17 at previous depressed levels but then fell during the first two quarters and fell even further after the 4 August MPC meeting resulted in a large tranche of cheap financing being made available to the banking sector by the Bank of England. Rates made a weak recovery towards the end of 2016 but then fell to fresh lows in March 2017.



Investment Outturn for 2016/17

Investment Policy – the Authority's investment policy is governed by CLG investment guidance, which has been implemented in the annual investment strategy approved by the Authority. This policy sets out the approach for choosing investment counterparties, and is based on credit ratings provided by the three main credit rating agencies, supplemented by additional market data, (such as rating outlooks, credit default swaps, bank share prices etc.

The investment activity during the year conformed to the approved strategy, and the Authority had no liquidity difficulties.

Appendix 1: Prudential and treasury indicators

-	Budget 2016/17 £m	Actual 2016/17 £m
	£m	£m
Capital Financing Requirement	3.874	3.229
Operational Boundary	3.333	3.333
Actual External Debt as at 31 March 2017		3.200
Authorised Limit	4.833	3.333
Upper limit for fixed interest rate exposure		
Net principal fixed rate borrowing / investments	100%	100%
Upper limit for variable interest rate exposure	100%	100%
Net principal variable rate borrowing / investments		
Upper limit for total principal sums invested for over 364 days	0%	0%
Maturity structure of new fixed rate borrowing during 2016/17:		
	Upper Limit	**Lower Limit**
under 12 months	100%	0%
12 months and with 24 months	100%	0%
24 months and within 5 years	100%	0%
5 years and within 10 years	100%	0%
10 years and above	100%	0%